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CURRENT DECISIONS
Dennison v. State falls into the category of decisions contrary to the
general tendency of the law. The court appears to have restricted the
applicability .of the decision by emphasizing the uniqueness of the
tract of land in question, 12 and therefore it is unlikely that this case
will prove determinative of the allowability of noise damage in all cases
where there has been a partial taking.
HALDANE ROBERT MAYER
Taxation-AINIED SERVICES-SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF
AcT-ImMuNrry OF NONRESIDENT SERVICEMAN FROM STATE SALES AND
USE TAXES. As a result of many incidents of sales and use taxation of
nonresident servicemen,' the United States brought suit against vari-
stroyed by the construction placed on the part taken the owner suffers
damages for which compensation must be paid. 68 Cal. Rptr; at 243.
Some states have decided the question both ways. Compare Tidewater Ry. v. Shartzer,
107 Va. 562, 59 SE. 407 (1907), with Lynchburg v. Peters, 156 Va. 40, 157 SE. 769
(1931); compare Fox v. Baltimore & O.R.R. 34 W.Va. 466, 12 SE. 757 (1890), with
Gardner v. Baily, 128 W.Va. 331, 36 S.E.2d 215 (1945). The more recently decided
cases in each state sited here have disallowed noise damages.
The courts exhibit an inability to commit themselves to any general rule. For two
recent decisiodis manifesting this indecisiveness, see Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233
Ore. 178, 376"P.2d 100 (1962); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2nd 324, 391
P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 989 (1965). Oregon follows the federal
"rule" for awarding damages, and Washington follows the "taken or damaged"
criteria. In both of these decisions the courts completely ignored their previ-
ous rulings to the contrary and allowed compensation for noise damage where
there had been no partial taking. Compare these two aviation cases with McQuaid v.
Portland & V. Ry, 18 Ore. 237, 22 P. 899 (1889); and Taylor v. Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry., 85 Wash. 592, 148 P. 887 (1915); DeKay v. North Yakima & Valley Ry,
71 Wash. 648, 129 P. 574 (1913); Smith v. St. Paul, Minneapolis R.R, 39 Wash. 355, 81
P. 840 (1905). See generally Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MicH. L. Rav. 1373, 1404
(1965) for an interesting discussion of these cases.
12. The holding written by Judge Keating accomplished this restriction by implica-
tion. The concurring opinion written by Chief Judge Fuld makes it clear that the
peacefulness of this particular tract was a unique quality of the land. The emphasis
was on the tranquility and privacy which would affect the market value of the
property.
This decision is in general keeping with others of similar kind in New York. Cf.
Zaremba v. State 29 N.Y. App. Div. 2d 723, 286 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1968); South Buffalo Ry.
Co. v. Kirkover, 176 N.Y. 301, 68 NE. 366 (1903). However, the restrictive wording
in Dennison should be emphasized.
1. Lieutenant Stanley D. Schuman of Nebraska and Commander Kent J. Carroll of
Michigan both purchased used motorboats in Connecticut from nondealers. Schuman
paid the use tax under protest; Carroll refused to pay. Commander Clyde H. Shaffer
of Pennsylvania purchased a new car from a Connecticut dealer who collected the sales
tax. Commander Jerome W. Roloff of Wisconsin bought a used car in Florida, and
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ous Connecticut officials to determine if such servicemen are subject
to Connecticut sales and use taxes. The lower court granted the Gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment and Connecticut appealed.3
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in affirming,4 held that
the collection of Connecticut's sales and use taxes6 from nonresident
servicemen present in the state solely pursuant to military orders was
in violation of section 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act."
paid a sales tax there. When he subsequently registered the car in Connecticut, he was
required to pay the difference between the Florida sales tax and the Connecticut use tax.
Commander William L. Foster purchased a new car from a Connecticut dealer and
at the same time registered it in Texas, his home state, paying a Texas sales tax. Never-
theless, the dealer collected a full Connecticut tax.
2. Lieutenant Schuman was also a plaintiff in the lower court, having brought a class
action pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and- all other servicemen
similarly situated. The district court dismissed this complaint for lack of jurisdiction
and no appeal has been taken.
3. United States v. Sullivan, 270 F. Supp. 236 (D. Conn. 1967).
4. United States v. Sullivan, 398 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1968).
5. CoNt. GEN. STArs. SS 12-406 to 12-432a (1958).
6. 50 U.S.C.A. § 574 (1964) states in relevant part:
(1) For the purposes of taxation in respect of any person, or of his
personal property, income, or gross income, by any State . . . such person
shall not be deemed to have lost a residence or domicile in any State ...
solely by reason of being absent therefrom in compliance with military or
naval orders, or to have acquired a residence or domicile in, or to have
become resident in or a resident of, any other State ... while, and solely
by reason of being, so absent. For the purposes of taxation in respect of the
personal property, income or gross income of any such person by any
State . . . of which such person is not a resident or in which he is not
domiciled, compensation for military or naval services performed within,
or from sources within, such State ... and personal property shall not be
deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in such
State . . . . Where the owner of personal property is absent from his
residence or domicile solely by reason of compliance with military or
naval orders, this section applies with respect to personal property, or the
use thereof, within any tax jurisdiction other than such place of residence
or domicile, regardless of where the owner may be serving in compliance
with such orders: Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall
prevent taxation by any State ... in respect of personal property used in
or arising from a trade or business, if it otherwise has jurisdiction. ...
(2) When used in this section, (a) the term "personal property" shall
include tangible and intangible property (including motor vehicles), and
(b) the term "taxation" shall include but not be limited to licenses, fees,
or excises imposed in respect to motor vehicles or the use thereof: Provided,
That the license, fee, or excise required by the State ... of which the person
is a resident or in which he is domiciled has been paid. (Hereinafter cited
as section 514.)
CURRENT DECISIONS
The plain vording of the statute, coupled with the absence of cases
to the contrary, indicates that, since its enactment, section 514 has
been clearly understood to apply to income tax and the conventional
recurring tax on personal property. However, two areas of contention
have developed concerning the interpretation of section 514: first,
the question of the validity of personal property taxation by a host
state, when the serviceman's state of residence has not levied a tax on
his personal property;8 and, second, the problem of the expansion of
section 514's protection to include the so-called privilege taxes.9
In Dameron v. Brodhead,10 the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of section 514 and concluded that the personal property of a
nonresident serviceman was not liable to taxation even though it has
not been taxed by the state of original residence. In California v. Buz-
ard,11 the Court was concerned with the types of taxes to be included
within the protection of section 514. The Court stated that the pur-
pose of the Civil Relief Act in freeing the nonresident serviceman from
paying personal property and income tax to the state in which he is
present solely by reason of military orders, is to relieve him of the
burden of supporting the government of that state. From the fore-
going, the Court concluded that an ad valorem tax on motor vehicles
which serves primarily to produce revenue, is precisely the type of
tax burden that section 514 was designed to eliminate.2
From the Buzard decision, it was a logical step for the court in the
instant case to hold that any general revenue-producing tax levied "in
respect of . . . personal property" 13 is within the scope of the pro-
tection afforded by section 514. The court of appeals had two grounds
for its decision. First, it adopted a literal interpretation of the phrase
"in respect of... personal property" '" which was consistent with the
7. The dearth of cases on this point may be due to the fact that the amount of tax
involved is usually not worth the price of litigation. This fact may account for the
Government's bringing the action in the instant case.
8. Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 US. 322 (1953).
9. California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386 (1966).
10. 345 U.S. 322, 326 (1953).
11. 382 U.S. 386, 395 (1966).
12. The Court clarified the phrase, "licenses, fees, or excises" as used in section
514(2), by saying that this phrase refers only to charges essential to the functioning
of the host state's licensing and registration laws. See Stephenson v. Curtis, 238 A.2d
613 (Me. 1968). See generally 19 ALA. L. REv. 215 (1966) and 8 WM. & MARY L. REv.
310 (1967).
13. 50 U.S.CA. § 574 (1964).
14. Id. The court had no difficulty in dismissing the argument that the sales and
1969]
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Supreme Court's instruction, m Le Maistre v. Leffers,15 to read the
Act "with an eye friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer
their country's call." Secondly, the court followed the precedent estab-
lished in California v. Buzard6 that a serviceman will not be required
to pay revenue-producing taxes to a state of which he is not a resident.
This decision, if affirmed by the Supreme Court,17 will greatly ex-
pand the protection afforded by the Civil Relief Act. To the extent
that state governments are supported by taxes "in respect of . per-
sonal property," '8 the nonresident serviceman will be relieved of the
burden of supporting any state government. 9 However, the states will
not be relieved of the responsibility of providing the nonresident ser-
viceman with all the facilities and services that it provides to its tax-
paying citizens.
FRED K. MoRRisoN
use taxes were a tax upon the seller and not the purchaser. The court stated that while
the tax is in terms based on the privilege of sale, what must be sold is "tangible
personal property," and that the tax is in reality assessed against the buyer of such
property. The Connecticut Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Avco Mfg.
Corp. v. Connelly, 145 Conn. 161, 140 A.2d 479 (1958).
15. 333 U.S. 1, 6 (1948).
16. 382 U.S. 386 (1966).
17. The State of Connecticut filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court on Oct.
7, 1968, (Docket No. 610).
18. 50 U.S.C.A. § 574 (1964).
19. The serviceman is required by the Act to pay a state income tax, if applicable,
to the state of his domicile. While it is lawful for the states to tax the personal property
of their absent resident servicemen, it is impractical and seldom done. See generally Lilly,
State Power to Tax the Service Member- An Examnation of Section 514 of the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 36 MIL. L. REv. 123 (1967). Califorma v. Buzard can be
interpreted to require the serviceman to pay, in either his home state or the host state,
that portion of a vehicle license fee which is used to directly support the states'
licensing and registration procedures. See Whiting v. Portsmouth, .202 Va. 609, 118 SE.
2d 505 (1961) (decided before the decision m Califorma v. Buzard) and the present
policy enunciated in a letter from the Attorney General of Virgima to the Honorable
Joseph E. Spruill, April 14, 1966, in which the Attorney General states that "license fees
levied on nonresident servicemen are no longer supportable." However, community
property states may still have the right to tax the serviceman's dependents' share of
their property See generally Flick, State Tax Liability of Serncemenr and Their
Dependents, 21 WAsa. & LEE L. Ry.. 22, 39 (1964).
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